In our paper, we present an analysis of rent seeking behavior in trade policy based on the Grossman-Helpman (G-H), "Protection for sale" framework. In their model, various lobbies in organized industries provide contributions to the government in return for influencing the tariff schedules. Our empirical implementation (similar to that of Maggi and Goldberg) is dealing with the problem of Polish trade policy in the late 1990s. We have used the instrumental variable approach to estimate the model, taking into account possible endogeneity of the regressors. Herfindahl index and unit subsidy level seem to be the best proxies for the industry organization level. The latter variable was used basing on the presumption that the sectors, which are better organized can receive higher pecuniary benefits.
The "Protection for Sale" model and Goldberg-Maggi estimation
The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model (G-H) is probably the most advanced and well known model of political economy. It is aimed at explaining the pattern of trade policy through operation of exogenous domestic lobbies.
In the early work of Findlay and Wellisz (1984) the interplay between domestic lobbies, representing capital and land owners, was represented by the "black box" tariff formation function. In the median voter model (Mayer, 1984) the trade policy was determined by majority vote. In the most elaborate G-H model the governmental policy is determined by elected politicians. They simultaneously consider the consumer welfare of electorate and contributions of lobbies, representing various sectors of the economy.
The formal G-H model, in a somewhat simplified version by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Feenstra (2004) , can be described as follows. There is a continuum of individuals 
On the production side there are N industries with sector specific (capital) inputs and labour. The total supply of labour has measure one. The numeraire good is produced with one unit of labour that the wage is equal to one. Each other good is produced from labour and factor specific input. The supply function of good i is denoted by ( ) The summing up of all indirect utilities of all individuals who belong to lobby i, and rearranging it, we get the welfare of lobby i equal to:
Therefore, the lobby's objective is to maximize:
On the other hand the objective of the government is to maximize a combination of social welfare and contributions received: Assuming that the interaction between lobbies and government takes the form of either "menu auction" or a Nash bargaining solution, the joint surplus of the society and lobbies can be written as:
. Taking into account the definition of ( )
rewrite Ω as:
represents the share of population that owns some specific factor, and i I is a dummy that takes value one if L i ∈ and zero otherwise.
The first order condition for Ω maximization over domestic prices (and tariffs) yields the following result: 
where i t is the ad valorem tariff, and i e is the import demand elasticity for good i .
The main conclusion from the model indicates that for organized sectors the level of protection increases with i i m x (inverse of import penetration), since
In other words, if domestic output (in relation to imports) is larger, then the owners of the specific factors have more to gain from increased protection. Also, sectors with higher price elasticity should be less protected. This is because the deadweight loss is larger with higher import demand elasticity. The main problem with empirical verification refers to possible endogenity of the import penetration ratio. The other practical difficulty is the question of correct selection of organized sectors. Therefore, Goldberg and Maggi (1994) estimated also, using maximum likelihood method, the other two equations.
‡ The first of the additional equations is a hypothetical inverse of import penetration function in the following form: Goldberg and Maggi (1999) , related to the level of non-tariff protection. § Indeed, in the original model, an industry paying a contributions shall be treated as organized. It was impossible to apply this concept directly since all industries pay some contributions.
The results of empirical work by Goldberg and Maggi are encouraging. The basic specification estimated value of γ =-0.0093 and that of δ =0.0106; thus both are broadly in line with predictions of G-H model. The implied values of β equals 0.986, which means that the consumer welfare is almost 100 times higher in government's objective function than the political contributions. In the other specification β equals 0.981 (but is statistically smaller than one), which is only slightly less optimistic.
Overview of other empirical studies
There is already a large sample of empirical studies of Grossman-Helpman model The major problem in most studies is the lack of data on political action committee campaign contributions, which could serve as the proxy for a sectoral political organization.
This sort of data is unavailable in countries other than U.S. It also seems that some authors did use real values of import penetration and not the estimated ones, despite the problem of possible endogeneity, which was analyzed by Goldberg-Maggi.
In some cases (e.g. McCalmam) the political organization variable was estimated using a probit model. In the same study a set of instruments were divided into two groups:
those that affect the probability of being politically organized, and those that account for comparative advantage, having possible impact on sectoral import penetration.
Probably the most extensive list of industry-specific variables was compiled by The specification of variables used in empirical studies can be, somewhat arbitrary, grouped into two broad categories of industry characteristics, having impact on political organization and import penetration.
The set of variables affecting the probability that sector is politically organized can itself be divided into two groups:
1. Industry specific institutional variables, which are analyzed in the empirical studies, include (with following expectations regarding their impact on tariffs):
• Political action committee campaign contributions made during congressional elections (higher contribution reflects better organization of the lobby) was used by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) • Degree of unionization: Higher level of workers' participation in trade unions (significant shares of employment) will induce higher wages and more protection (Mitra, Thomakos, Ulubasoglu (2002) and Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga (2001) • Industrial concentration (e.g. herfindahl index) should be highly correlated with the tariff structure, according to theoretical predictions. Likewise, highly concentrated sectors tend to receive higher tariffs (Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga (2001) and
McCalman (2004).
• The employment share of the sector in the country's total employment: The larger the industry seeking protection, the greater is the incentive to join in the tariff-setting process. The argument cited by Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga (2001) and McCalman (2004) .
• The level of FDI inflow to the sector. There two arguments developed by Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga (2001) why, in developing countries, tariffs may be higher in sectors with large shares of FDI:
o Owners of foreign capital may have access to a better lobbying technology.
Probably multinational companies have a larger experience of lobbying in different countries which they can adapt to the host government.
o Governments may be more sensitive to FDI interests than to the interests of nationals. This may be so from the fact that foreign companies may be more credible in the lobbying game than domestic producers.
On the other hand there is a large list of variables, used in empirical studies, reflecting the comparative advantage of the industry. These variables can have impact on import penetration and on possible political organization, as well. They can be divided in two subgroups:
1. The factor intensity characteristics, representing a comparative advantage of the industry
• the labour intensity. The more labour-intensive an industry, the more labour votes it has. The variable is usually measured by the labour cost share. This argument was cited by Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga (2001) • The wage per worker. Disadvantaged industries, having low wages, often receive more protection. An industry is disadvantaged if it is a low-skill and hence low-wage industry (Trefler 1993) and McCalman (2004) .
• A high capital/labour ratio industries receive lower protection (Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga (2001) and McCalman (2004) .
• Human capital/labour ratio (e.g. number of professional and technical employees/workers). Sectoral abundance of human capital in a developed country is • declining industries (those with large increases in import penetration) tend to obtain more protection (Hillman, 1982, or Brainard and Verdier, 1994) . They tend to receive more protection so as to reduce adjustment costs (Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga, 2001 ).
In a dynamic context, the compensation effect predicts that slow-growing industries will lobby more as the opportunity cost of lobbying will be lower.
• the import penetration ratio (the higher the import penetration, the more will the affected industry lobby for protection, so as to decrease competition and maintain its market share (Trefler 1993) ). The problem of possible endogenity of the import penetration has already been discussed.
• The level of intra-industry trade. Industries seeking protection, with lower the intraindustry trade, will find their task harder if they have to counter not only consumer dissatisfaction, but also producers who purchase their goods as intermediates (Marvel and Ray, 1983 ).
• The share of exports in the industry's production. The export-oriented industries do not require protection either because they face no import competition or because, with intra-industry trade, protection will provoke unwanted foreign retaliation (Trefler, 1993) .
The large number of variables used reflects difficulties in finding suitable measures and limited availability of some statistical data in analyzed countries. In our empirical part we will concentrate only on some of those variables, which are available for Poland.
Poland's trade policy in 1990's
The opening up of Polish economy was an important element of economic transformation. The trade liberalization started in January 1990 when zloty became convertible and almost all-domestic prices were released from administrative control.
Majority of non-tariff measures were eliminated at that time. The new customs code, introduced in January of 1990, was compatible with international norms. The tariff description, the rules of customs' valuation, and the anti-dumping procedures were in principle in line with the GATT articles. The average level of tariffs was 8.9 per cent ad valorem in the beginning of 1990. But the tariff structure was not fully adapted to requirements of the market economy, and was somewhat arbitrary.
At that time Poland's tariffs were not subject to the discipline of the GATT and the government had freedom to manoeuvre in shaping its tariff structure. Poland had no legal constraint in the form "bound" tariff schedule, although it was a GATT member since 1967. A former communist country had a unique reciprocity formula in the Protocol of accession to GATT. In exchange for the MFN status among GATT members', Poland committed itself to increase the value of its imports from the members of GATT by at least seven percent annually. This commitment became impossible to fulfil by the mid 1970's. But formally nothing has been changed until the creation of the WTO in 1994. Therefore tariff changes were feasible in beginning of 1990. ** On August 1, 1991, the new customs tariff came into force. The new tariff adopted commodity nomenclature applied by the European Community (EC). It covered 10,000 tariff items and the level of duties was substantially raised. Average nominal (unweighted) customs rates calculated on the basis of MFN were raised from 11.65 to 17.02.
† † The change was feasible because Polish tariffs were unbound in the GATT.
"The increase was motivated by the need to increase fiscal revenues, and by the desire to afford a degree of protection to Polish producers competing with imports. Among products that were granted high protection were particularly "sensitive" agricultural goods, such as butter and meat, automobiles and electronics." ‡ ‡ It shows that the notion of sensitive product was not clearly defined at that time. The tariff structure was determined, almost from scratch, in early 1990s by governmental decisions and it seems that the interest groups probably did not have very strong influence on the process. The organizations of producers (chambers) were just being established. However, the trade unions were quite powerful. Afterwards the level of import duties was gradually reduced over next years. The scope of reductions was quite impressive in the case of preferential duties. We show some anecdotical evidence that the tariff changes were influenced by lobbies' pressure.
In January 1992, shortly after signing the Europe Agreement, Poland raised MFN customs duties for motor vehicles from 15 to 35 percent. At the same time the duty free quota . In 1994, for the first time, the clause was applied to imported telecommunication equipment from the EU members.
According to the government the decision resulted from the necessity of restoring the profitability of telecommunication equipment manufacturing in Poland, which was based on imports of components for this equipment. The restructuring clause was also used in 1996 to oil-refining products. Poland extended the period of reducing customs duties on oil-refining products until 2001 (according to the original timetable, customs duties were to be brought down to 0 percent at the beginning of 1999). † † † † The restructuring clause, was applied for the third time, in 1997. Poland decided then to maintain tariffs at 9% in order to protect its restructuring of steel industry, despite the time- Can we trace the impact of organized groups on Poland's government objectives using the methodology from Goldberg and Maggi study?
In the next part of the paper we will present an empirical study of the endogenous tariff policy in Poland in mid 1990's. The selection of the period is not accidental. As we argued the trade policy was still autonomous in early 1990s, but the flexibility in tariff formation slowly decreased in the late 1990s, when Europe Agreement and Uruguay Round duty reduction commitments were gradually implemented. We also believe that the tariffs, 
Estimation technique and data
In our study we adopt a modified version of the empirical specification proposed by Goldberg and Maggi. The original paper estimates equation (3) in a maximum likelihood framework. Since both variables, inverse import penetration and industry organisation dummy may be affected by the level of tariffs, there might be an endogeneity problem. This is resolved by using instruments for both variables in question. In our case, the data on the industry contributions were unavailable, since in the 1990s there was no official way for the industry to contribute to political campaign. However, as the anecdotic evidence above shows, there were cases where trade policy was changed, obviously as a result of some interest groups pressure. In the absence of direct measures of industry organisation, we have used similar variables to those used in literature, as a proxy for industry organization. These variables include: Herfindahl concentration indices, capital-labour ratio (as we may expect that labour intensive industry may exert more pressure on the government), export intensity (since export industries may be specifically promoted by governmet policy) and share of government subsides in the total value of sales.
The last variable requires some comments, since it has not been used in the other empirical studies. On the one hand, subsidies could be treated as a variable equivalent to import duties, measuring the "remuneration" paid by the government to an industry in exchange for contributions. On the other hand, the receipt of subsidies by a given industry can reflect the level of political organization; organized sectors, where interest groups are stronger, can probably receive higher pecuniary benefits. In Poland, chambers of producers were not well organized, but trade unions were powerful, being able to influence governments' decisions. That is why we treat unit subsidies as a measure which can explain the level of industry organization.
We construct four versions of the variable I (one for each of the variables above) in the following way: it takes the value of 1 if the variable in question for a given industry is higher than the average for the given year and it takes the value of zero otherwise. Using the proxied variable is probably less prone to the endogeneity problem as using the contributions directly (also, Maggi and Goldberg in their sensitivity study, used non-instrumented I in the regression and obtained similar results).
Where the endogeneity problem is more severe is the inverse import penetration that may be heavily affected by the tariff on the left hand-side of the equation. Also, what the Grossman and Helpman model cares about is trade flows that stem from the Heckscher-Ohlin type of comparative advantage. We construct the inverse import penetration ratio in the same fashion as Maggi and Goldberg. In order to avoid the endogeneity problem, we regress the actual inverse import penetration ratio on capital-labour ratios, the value of investment, stock of capital, wage level and employment level. Therefore, we estimate two versions of the first stage model with employment included and excluded -since both capital and employment are already included in the capital-labour ratio (see Table 3 of Appendix). This way we can project the theoretical inverse import penetration as a reflection of comparative advantage stemming from factor endowments. The full model has the following form, similar to equation (3) of the Goldberg and Maggi study :
where t i is the tariff, e i is the elasticity of import demand, ε and i µ are error terms. We estimate equation (7) by OLS and include the projected inverse import penetration ratio on the right hand-side of equation (6), which we estimate by OLS. The specifications and results for both versions (models) of equation (7) are given in the Table 3 of Appendix.
Data on both the conventional (MFN) ***** tariffs and tariffs applied towards the EU countries † † † † † for Poland for most of the 1990s comes from the Foreign Trade Data Center (CIHZ). This data uses the 8 digit Combined Nomenclature aggregation, which we aggregate into the 3-digit NACE using a Eurostat Concordance table. We use the Polish import data from Eurostat's Comext Database as weights. The output, export, import, subsidies, capital, labour, wage data comes from Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS). Data on Herfindahl indices were calculated using the micro-level GUS data in possession of National Bank of Poland. The data on import demand elasticities were unavailable for Poland. The study often used in the literature is the Shiells, Stern and Deardorff (1986) . However, since not only it provides elasticities for a different economy and period but also uses SITC 3-digit ***** Conventional tariffs are "bound" duties applied to imports from all the WTO members. † † † † † Very similar tariffs were also applied to imports from EFTA and CEFTA members states.
classification, we have decided to set the elasticity of import demand for all sectors at -1. Our final dataset includes data for 87 NACE rev. 1.1 3 digit sectors for the period of 1996-1999.
Estimation results
We have estimated the system of equations (6) and (7) Table 1 . The estimation for preferential EU duties are given on the Appendix. . In most cases, we find strong support for the first two hypotheses. In all periods it is true for specifications using industry concentration and subsidies levels as a proxy for industry organisation. In the case of export intensity and capital and labour ratio, we find only limited support for the second relation. In most cases we find only weak support for the third relation (the sum of two coefficients is not statistically greater than zero). We can recover the structural parameters of the Grossman and Helpman model. As above:
( ) Results from estimations using model 2 as first stage regression are listed in from one (the test using Delta method rejects the hypothesis of equality to 1 at least 5% significance in most cases). This is a higher weight than in the original Maggi and Goldberg estimation (around 0.98). The parameter L α suggests that the large fraction of the population (at least 50%) is represented by a lobby. What it suggests is that lobbies had a smaller influence on trade policy than in the case of the United States, but this influence is still significant. Such low parameter estimates (while significant) stems from the fact, that overall tariff level is quite low (average tariff during the period under consideration is 12 percent for MFN duties and close to 2 percent for preferential tariffs). We could use some rescaling factor (as in original Maggi and Goldberg), however, the meaning of coefficients becomes unclear.
Conclusions
The model of endogenous trade policy determination by Grossman and Helpman has had many empirical implementations in the literature. Our version deals with the problem of Polish trade policy in the late 1990s. We have used the instrumental variable approach to estimate the model taking into account endogeneity of the regressors. Herfindahl index and unit subsidy level seem to be the best proxies for the industry organization level. The latter variable was used basing on the presumption that the sectors which are better organized can receive higher pecuniary benefits.
Our results are in line with the predictions of the theory. Most of our regressions support the theory and we find support for the significance of lobbies in formation of trade policy in Poland. The Grossman and Helpman model seems to work much better in the case of MFN than for preferential tariffs. There is some anecdotic evidence that lobbies had influenced Polish trade policy several times, and this evidence is confirmed in our calculations. The importance of the lobbies is, however, significantly lower than in the case of the United States, which is in line with our expectations. 
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